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JURISDICTION 
By Order dated February 27, 1990, the Supreme Court of Utah 
transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
§78-2-2(4) Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
Jurisdiction is, therefore, established pursuant to S78-2a-
3(2) (j) Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Chipman1 argues that this Court must accept the facts upon 
which the motion in the court below was based and that there is 
no dispute as to those facts. Chipman also argues that this 
Court is to review the lower court's ruling for correctness, 
without according any deference thereto. That is not the appro-
priate standard of review. The appropriate standard is to review 
the lower courtfs ruling for an abuse of discretion. Laub v. 
South Central Telephone Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1982), 
Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App. 1989). Also, 
throughout its brief, Chipman discusses the facts of the under-
lying action, in an apparent attempt to have this Court conduct a 
de novo review of those facts. This Court should not examine the 
merits of the underlying action, see e.g., Larsen v. Collina, 684 
p.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1984), but merely determine whether the trial 
court abused its broad discretion in denying Chipman1s motion. 
Chipman is used to collectively refer to 
defendant/appellant Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., Inc. and D. Ray 
Chipman. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ruling that it 
did not have jurisdiction to hear defendant/appellant Chipman's 
motions?2 
DISPOSITIVE RULE 
Rule 60, Utah R. Civ. P. is set forth in Addendum 7. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Chipman sets forth a narrative of what he believes to be the 
facts of the underlying action, and the events surrounding the 
settlement of that action. The Richinses have disputed many of 
those facts. The Porters believe that the Richins's rendition of 
the facts is more in line with the evidence. However, Porters 
submit that most of the facts set forth by Chipman are immaterial 
to the issue before the court. 
Nature of the case and course of proceedings below. 
This is an appeal from a final order entered on October 4, 
1989, by the Fourth Judicial District Court which denied a motion 
to set aside a judgment entered January 6, 1988. The motion was 
filed on March 7, 1989. The judgment of January 6, 1988 was 
Chipmanfs motions were titled Motion to Enforce 
Termination of Lease Pursuant to Stipulation in Court or, in the 
Alternative, to Set Aside or to Reform the Stipulation, 
Stipulation for Settlement and Judgment, and Judgment, which 
motion sought to set aside the judgment based on several 
theories. (R. 214). 
2 
entered upon a stipulation of counsel, midway through a trial on 
a dispute over livestock grazing permits. 
Statement of facts. 
1. On or about May 6, 1987, the Rlchinses filed a Verified 
Complaint against Chipman and the Porters. According to the 
Richins's theory, Chipman leased certain grazing permits to them 
in October of 1986 and then leased some of the same permits to 
the Porters in April of 1987. (R.l-6). 
2. Trial of the underlying action began on December 21, 
1987, before the court, sitting without a jury. After the 
Richinses rested their case in chief the court took a recess for 
lunch. (R. 604). 
3. When court resumed the parties indicated they had 
reached a settlement which was recited, for the record, by 
counsel for the Richinses. (A complete transcript of the oral 
stipulation is attached as Addendum 1). At that time the follow-
ing exchange was had between the court and parties: 
THE COURT: All right counsel I understand that you 
have reached a stipulation and an agreement in this 
matter? 
MR. BROWN (Counsel for Richins): I think we have your 
honor. 
(R.505) 
• * * 
MR. WOOTTON (Counsel for Chipman): Mr. Chipman you 
have been in court and listened to that stipulation 
have you not sir? 
MR. CHIPMAN: What stipulation. 
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MR. WOOTTON: The one Mr. Brown just stated into the 
record? 
MR. CHIPMAN: Well I don't understand it. 
MR. WOOTTON: Well have you been in here and you under-
stand it? 
MR. CHIPMAN: I have been in here a long time and I 
don't quite understand it but I guess it is all right. 
MR. WOOTTON: All right Mr. Osterthorpe you are Mr. 
Chipman's friend? 
MR. OSTERTHORPE (a friend and confidant of Mr. 
Chipman): Yes. 
MR. WOOTTON: You have been in the courtroom and heard 
it too? 
MR. OSTERTHORP: Yes. 
MR. WOOTTON: And do you think it is reasonable? 
MR. OSTERTHORP: Yes. 
MR. WOOTTON: That is all. 
(R.512,513), (emphasis added). 
• * * 
THE COURT: All right the court finds that the stipula-
tion is fair and accurate and approve the same and Mr. 
Brown if you will prepare the necessary Order for the 
court to sign in this regard and submit it to Mr. Hunt 
and Mr. Wootton for approval as to form then we will 
get this case over with. 
MR. WOOTTON: Thank you your honor. 
MR. HUNT: Thank you your honor. 
MR. BROWN: Thank you your honor. 
THE COURT: Again let me compliment each of you and 
thank you for the hard work you put in and I know this 
has been a very difficult and tedious case and required 
a lot of hard work for settlement. I still believe 
this is the best answer to this case thank you again. 
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You have all done a fine job. If nothing further the 
court will be in recess. 
(R.514). 
4. On December 29, 1987, the parties, through their coun-
sel, submitted a written stipulation to the court upon which 
judgment was entered. (Attached as Addendum 2). This 
Stipulation for Settlement and Judgment was approved and signed 
by Chipman's counsel of record. (R.206) The Judgment on 
Stipulation was approved by all counsel, including Chipman's and 
then signed by the court. (R. 209). (Attached as Addendum 3). 
5. The parties performed pursuant to the stipulation and 
judgment for over one year. The day the court signed the judg-
ment, substantial amounts of money were disbursed to the Porters 
and Chipman, as part of the settlement. (R. 211,212). Chipman 
accepted the money at that time, and has never returned it to the 
court or any of the other parties. 
6. On March 9, 1989 Chipman filed a motion to set aside the 
judgment based upon several grounds. (R. 214). 
7. By Order dated October 4, 1989, the district court 
denied Chipman's motion finding that it was without jurisdiction 
to hear the matter. (R. 452). (Attached as Addendum 4). 
8. Chipman filed a notice of appeal on October 26, 1989. 
(R.454). 
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9. Since the time the settlement was reached, Mr. Chipman 
has died and his death was suggested upon the record in the Utah 
Supreme Court on January 5, 1990. (Attached as Addendum 5). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should review the lower court's order of 
October 4, 1989 for an abuse of discretion, which is broad in 
this situation. 
The trial court was correct in denying Chipman*s motion to 
set aside the judgment because the motion was untimely, being 
filed some fourteen months after the judgment was entered. 
Chipman1s motion fits squarely within the provisions of Rule 
60(b)(1) Utah R. Civ. P. and therefore should have been filed 
within three months of the judgment. 
The record in this case shows that Chipman agreed to the 
stipulation and judgment he now challenges. He is also bound by 
the actions of his counsel of record who agreed to the stipula-
tion in open court and, several days later, signed a written 
stipulation and then, in writing, approved the judgment before it 
was signed by the court. If Chipman is correct that his counsel 
did not give him adequate representation, his remedy is a separ-
ate action against his counsel. A civil action may not be 
reversed because privately retained counsel was incompetent. 
Chipman accepted the benefits of the stipulation and judg-
ment, and allowed the other parties to significantly change their 
positions in reliance upon the stipulation and judgment. Chipman 
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has thereby ratified the judgment, even if he can show that he 
did not originally agree to it. The policy consideration in 
favor of the finality of judgments, particularly after a signi-
ficant passage of time and reliance thereupon by the other 
parties, is applicable to and compelling in this case. 
Finally, Mr. Chipman is now deceased and the trial court 
would be unable to take any further action in this case, in as 
much as the settlement was reached midway through the trial, 
before Chipman had put on any evidence. As a practical matter 
there is no way to obtain any additional evidence about the 
settlement, or the underlying action. The trial court would be 
forced to fashion a remedy in a vacuum. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CHIPMAN AGREED TO THE STIPULATION AND THE 
JUDGMENT RENDERED UPON THE STIPULATION. 
Chipman argues that neither he nor his attorney agreed to 
the stipulation. (Chipman Brief, pp. 10-11). A reading of the 
transcript of the proceedings will expose the fallacy of this 
argument. It is true that neither Mr. Wootton nor Mr. Chipman 
stated, in so many words, "I agree and accept the stipulation." 
Such is not required. Acceptance can be implied from conduct as 
well as words, America Aviation, Inc. v. Hinds, 465 P.2d 676, 677 
(Wash. App. 1970), and, in some circumstances even silence is an 
acceptance of an agreement where there is a duty to speak. JLd. 
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See also, Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 664 P.2d 
1000, 1005 (N.M. App. 1983). 
What is apparent from the transcript is that Mr. Wootton and 
Mr. Chipman assented to the stipulation by their acts and words. 
The transcript is conspicuous for what is missing. If Chipman 
and his lawyer did not agree with the stipulation, they certainly 
made no effort to convey that to the court. Instead, Mr. 
Chipman stated that although he did not completely understand the 
stipulation he thought "it was all right." This statement alone 
shows that Chipman was relying upon his counsel to agree to the 
stipulation, if appropriate. It is unlikely that litigants ever 
fully understand stipulations reached in complex cases such as 
this. That is the reason they rely upon their counsel. Mr. 
Wootton thanked the court after the court stated that the stipu-
lation was fair and accurate and approved it. Mr. Wootton1s 
comments and actions show his agreement with and acceptance of 
the settlement, on behalf of his client. Certainly, the court's 
approval of the stipulation created a duty on Mr. Wootton and 
Chapman's part to speak up if they disagreed with it. Mr. 
Osterthorpe, Chipman's friend and confidant, also agreed that the 
settlement was reasonable. Although Mr. Osterthorpe's statements 
certainly cannot bind or prejudice Chipman, they are evidence 
that the people present in the court that day had a meeting of 
the minds. 
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Chipman argues that he was not effectively represented by 
counsel, i.e., his lawyer was intoxicated at the time the oral 
stipulation was made, and, therefore, there was no agreement. If 
this assertion is true, Chipman1s remedy lies elsewhere. "A 
civil action is not reversed because privately retained counsel 
was incompetent. If trial counsel was indeed incompetent, then 
(the client) may be entitled to seek redress against him in a 
separate action." Cruz v. Montova, 660 P.2d 723, 728 (Utah 
1983). The policy considerations for this rule are compelling: 
The law favors the amicable settlement of dis-
putes, and is inclined to view them with finality. An 
agreement arrived at in this matter is binding on the 
parties and will not be reviewed on appeal unless the 
party contesting it can show that the stipulation was a 
product of fraud or that the attorney over-reached his 
authority . . . . [Q]nce a client has designated an 
attorney to represent him, the court and other parties 
to the action are entitled to relv upon that authority 
until the relationship is terminated. 
We subscribe to the principle that a person 
attempting to dislocate an in-court settlement of a 
claim has the burden of showing that the agreement was 
a product of fraud or over-reaching. 
* • * 
Furthermore, a trial court's determination that the 
parties fully appreciated the terms of the settlement 
will not be disturbed where it is supported by the 
evidence. Here, the record supports the court's find-
ing that Ms. Tompkins was fully apprised of the settle-
ment terms immediately before her attorney presented 
them in open court. Nevertheless, she voluntarily 
absented herself from the courtroom during the oral 
stipulation, indicating that she acquiesced in the 
settlement. 
Snyder v. Tompkins, 579 P.2d 994, 999 (Wash. 1978), (citations 
omitted; emphasis added). 
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The Supreme Court of Utah has stated: 
An attorney, in his function as an officer of the 
court, may stipulate for and bind the party he repre-
sents on any matter of proper concern in the proceed-
ing, including the receiving of evidence which might 
otherwise not be admissible. This is particularly so 
where it is made in the presence and with the under-
standing and accord of the party. 
State ex rel. Davis, 28 Utah 2d 428, 503 P.2d 1206, 1207 (1972). 
See also, Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 2d 416, 260 P.2d 
741, 743 (1953). 
The totality of the circumstances show that there was a 
settlement reached in open court, by Chipman and through the 
binding actions of his lawyer. 
Furthermore, even if there was some confusion when the 
stipulation was recited in open court, that problem should have 
been resolved before Mr. Wootton signed the written stipulation 
and then approved the judgment several days later. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING CHIPMANS MOTION. 
Following a hearing upon Chipman's motion seeking to set 
aside the Judgment on Stipulation, the trial court entered a 
final order finding that Chipman's motion was within the scope of 
Rule 60(b)(1) Utah R. Civ. P., and, because the motion was made 
some 14 months after the judgment was entered, it was untimely, 
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leaving the court without jurisdiction to set aside the judg-
ment .3 
A
* The Trial Court has Broad Discretion in Ruling on a Motion 
for Relief from a Judgment. 
It has been stated: 
The trial court is endowed with considerable 
latitude of discretion in granting or denying a motion 
to relieve a party from a final judgment under Rule 
60(b)(1), U.R.C.P., and this court will reverse the 
trial court only where an abuse of this discretion is 
clearly established. 
Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 
429, 431 (1973). 
Furthermore, before an abuse of discretion can be found, 
"public policy demands more than a mere statement that a person 
did not have his day in court when full opportunity for a fair 
hearing was afforded to him. 
The movant must show that he has used due diligence and that 
he was prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he 
had no control." State ex rel. Summers Children, 560 P.2d 331, 
335 (Utah 1977), (emphasis in original). 
Chipman has not clearly established that there was an abuse 
of discretion in this case. Chipman could have objected to the 
stipulation any time during the course of the in court proceed-
3
 See e.g., Richards v. Siddowav, 24 Utah 2d 314, 317, 471 
P.2d 143, 145 (1970), Devine v. Cluff, 725 P.2d 181 (Idaho App. 
1986), and Household Finance Corp. v. Frve, 445 A.2d 991 (D.C. 
App. 1982), for the proposition that if motions under Rule 60(b) 
are not timely made, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to set 
aside the judgment. 
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ings and could have forbade his attorney from executing the 
written stipulation and approving the Judgment On Stipulation. 
Instead, both Chipman and his counsel sat silent while the court 
indicated its approval of the settlement and complimented the 
parties, and their lawyers for reaching the settlement. Rather 
than having no control over the circumstances, Chipman had 
complete control. The affidavit submitted by Mr. Wootton (R.381-
387) (Attached as Addendum 6), refutes nearly everything Chipman 
is claiming in this case and therefore no abuse is clearly 
established. It seems Chipman merely had a change of heart and 
tried to back out of the settlement with the courts's blessing. 
If litigants were so easily able to recant their settlements, it 
would create havoc within the judicial system. 
B. The Basis for Chipman's Motion is Within the Purview of Rule 
60(b)(1) Utah. R. Civ. P. 
Chipman has appealed the trial courts order because "Chipman 
believes its motions fall within Rule 60(b)(5), (6) or (7), Rule 
60(a) or is otherwise outside the three-months restriction of 
Rule 60(b)(1)." (Chipman Brief, p. 2.) Chipman does not explain 
how it motion fits into these other sections. Chipman's posi-
tion, in essence, is that (1) he did not agree to the stipula-
tion, (2) he was not effectively represented by counsel and, (3) 
the stipulation and judgment are unfair, ambiguous and uncon-
scionable. 
12 
1- The judgment challenged is not void. 
Under subsection (5) of Rule 60(b), a judgment may be set 
aside if it is void. In the interest of the finality of judg-
ments , the concept of void judgments is narrowly construed. King 
v. Everett, 775 P.2d 65/ 67 (Colo. App. 1989). No authority or 
facts are cited by Chipman which support the position that the 
judgment rendered in this case is void. In fact, Chipman1s 
assertions, even if true, show that the judgment is, at best, 
voidable. An unconscionable contract is voidable, not void. See 
e.g., Warner v. Rasmussen, 704 P.2d 559, 560 (Utah 1985). The 
rule allowing a court to relieve a party from a void judgment 
does not apply to a voidable judgment. Interstate Counseling 
Service v. Emeline, 396 P.2d 727, 728-29 (Mont. 1964). 
There is no basis to find that the judgment was void. ,f[A] 
judgment is not void merely because it is erroneous or because 
some irregularity inhered in its rendition. It is void only if 
the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject 
matter or of the parties or if the court acted in a manner 
inconsistent with due process." Automatic Feeder Co. v. Tobev, 
558 P.2d 101, 104 (Kan. 1976), (emphasis added). Chipman had 
every opportunity to be heard in the court below and the court 
had jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties. Therefore, 
subsection (5) does not apply to Chipman's motion. 
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2
* Subsection (6) does not provide Chipman the relief he 
seeks, 
Chipman argues that subsection (6) applies because "it is no 
longer equitable for the judgment to have prospective applica-
tion.11 (Chipman Brief, p. 7.) This aspect of subsection (6) "is 
designed to provide relief form orders such as an injunction that 
have prospective application." First Security Bank v. Neibaur, 
570 P.2d 276, 283, nt. 4 (Idaho 1977) (emphasis in original). 
In some situations, subsection (6) can be applied to other 
orders and judgments, but only to their prospective features. It 
cannot be used to set aside the complete order or judgment, as 
Chipman seeks to do here. 7 Moore's Federal Practice §60.26[4] 
(2d ed. 1975). And it may not be used to modify a judgment 
unless a change of circumstances has rendered the judgment 
inequitable. Justice Cardozo explained this point in United 
States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932): 
There is need to keep in mind steadily the limits 
of inquiry before us. We are not framing a decree, we 
are asking ourselves whether anything has happened that 
will justify us now in changing a decree. The injunc-
tion, whether right or wrong, is not subject to 
impeachment in its application to the conditions that 
existed at its making. We are not at liberty to 
reverse under the quise of readjusting. 
• * * 
The distinction is between restraints that give protec-
tion to rights fully accrued upon facts so nearly 
permanent as to be substantially impervious to change, 
and those that involve the supervision of changing 
conduct or conditions and are thus provisional and 
tentative. 
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There has been no change of circumstances in this case, only 
a change of heart. 
3- Chipman's claim, in essence, is one of mistake, 
inadvertence, and excusable neglect. 
The strategy adopted by Chipman in this case is not unique. 
An appellate court from Hawaii recently made an observation that 
applies to this case as well: 
A quite typical kind of case is that in which a 
party comes in more than a year after judgment to 
assert that he is the victim of some blunder by his 
counsel. Claims of this kind seem to fit readily 
enough within such grounds as mistake, inadvertence, 
and excusable neglect, all stated in clause (1), and 
the courts frequently have so reasoned and held that 
clause (6) (7, in the Utah rules) was inapplicable. 
But if the court is persuaded that the interests of 
justice so require, it is likely to find aggravating 
circumstances sufficient to permit it to say that the 
case is properly within clause (6). 
City and County of Honolulu v. Bennett, 627 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Haw. 
App. 1981), quoting from 11 Wright & Miller, S 2864 (1973). 
In this case, the trial court did not find the circumstances 
so aggravating as to invoke subsection (7), and that decision 
should be affirmed. 
In the case of Peck v. Cook, 29 Utah 2d 375, 510 P.2d 530 
(1973), plaintiff obtained a default judgment against defendant. 
Thereafter, defendant was adjudged a bankrupt. More than three 
months after the judgment was entered, plaintiff filed a motion 
to set aside the default judgment on the ground that through the 
mistake, inadvertence and excusable neglect of his attorney, he 
had failed to allege that defendant induced the debt through 
fraud. An order was entered granting plaintiff's motion to set 
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aside the default judgment. Approximately one month later, 
defendant filed a motion to set aside the prior order; this 
motion was granted. Plaintiff appealed. In addressing plain-
tiff's appeal, the Supreme Court state: 
Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., provides that a motion under 
subdivision (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect, shall be made not more than three 
months after the judgment was entered. Plaintiff's 
motion was not timely filed. The order or the trial 
court is affirmed. 
id. 
As in the Peck case, if the facts are as Chipman claims, the 
judgment he seeks to set aside resulted from a mistake, inadver-
tence or excusable neglect of his attorney, and his motions were, 
therefore, untimely. 
4. The Provisions of Rule 60(b)(7) May Not Be Used to 
Circumvent the Temporal Limitations of 60(b)(1). 
It is well settled that "subdivision (7) cannot apply (to 
situations governed by subdivision (1), and may not be used to 
circumvent the three-month filing period." Laub v. South Central 
Utah Telephone Assoc, Inc., 657 P.2d 1304, 1308 (Utah 1982). 
See also, Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 946 (Utah 1987), Kanzee 
v. Kanzee, 668 P.2d 495, 497 (Utah 1983), Estate of Pepper, 711 
P.2d 261, 263 (Utah 1985). It is clear, therefore, that if 
Chipman's motion is within the scope of Rule 60(b)(1), sub-
division (7) cannot apply. Furthermore, as was stated in Lamb, 
subsection (7) is only to be applied in unusual circumstances and 
"should be very cautiously and sparingly invoked by the Court 
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only in unusual and exceptional instances." Id. at 1307-1308. 
Such things as claims of lack of due process fit within sub-
division (7). Estate of Pepper, 711 P.2d 261, 263 (Utah 1985). 
No such claim is made in this case. The "any other reason" 
language of subsection (7) is not a blanket authorization for 
reconsideration for all conceivable reasons, but must relate to 
irregularities which are extraneous to the action of the court or 
go to the question of the regularity of its proceedings. State 
v. Keller, 647 P.2d 35 (Wash. 1982). Chipman has not set forth 
any evidence indicating his position is unusual and exceptional 
or that the proceedings before the court were in any way 
irregular. Neither is there a claim that something extraneous to 
the court proceedings somehow affected the result in this case. 
5. Rule 60(a) has no application to Chipman's motion. 
Chipman argues that a careful reading of Rule 60(a) indicates 
that it does not apply to just clerical errors. A careful 
reading of applicable case law indicates Chipman is mistaken. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has stated, "[t]he distinction between 
a judicial error and a clerical error does not depend upon who 
made it. Rather, it depends on whether it was made in rendering 
the judgment or recording the judgment as rendered." Richards v. 
Siddowav, 24 Utah 2d 314, 317, 471 P.2d 143, 145 (1970), Lindsay 
v. Atkin, 680 P.2d 401, 402 (Utah 1984). 
If the error complained of is judicial rather than clerical, 
such an error must be corrected by an appeal, a timely motion 
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under Rule 60(b) or an independent action. JIcL The statements 
made by the trial judge upon which Chipman relies for this point 
evidence, if anything, a judicial error, not a clerical error. 
Furthermore, Chipman does not show how the recorded judgment is 
different than the oral stipulation which was approved by the 
trial court judge. 
In fact, the judge stated the following: 
My main concern and I may be offbase, Mr. Marsh, when I 
say this but it appeared to me that your client, Mr. 
Chipman, screwed these things around so bad whether he 
did it unintentionally or intentionally? If he did it 
intentionally it was an absolute fraud. If he did it 
unintentionally it is the height of stupidity. I just 
felt that if it could be settled that would save his 
bacon a lot more than continuing with the trial and 
apparently it hasn't. Apparently it has created a real 
problem. It might be just because of interpretation or 
it might be that Mr. Wootton wasn't diligent in settle-
ment or whatever. I never put pencil to paper to 
figure out every jot and tittle. I just listened to 
the stipulation. Jurisdiction can be challenged at any 
time. It appears to me that it has been challenged and 
I am going to give you an opportunity to respond to 
that. 
(R. 623-624). 
Rule 60(a) does not apply to this case. 
6. Strong policy considerations support the decision 
rendered by the trial court. 
In Laub v. South Central Utah Telephone Assoc, Inc., 657 
P.2d 1304 (Utah), the Court noted that Rule 60(b) Utah R. Civ. P. 
brings into conflict the competing interests of the finality of 
judgments and relief from inequitable judgments. That is pre-
cisely why Rule 60(b) contains different time restrictions for 
the different reasons to challenge a judgment. Soon after a 
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judgment has been rendered, there are many avenues to challenge 
the judgment. The reason for this is that the parties have not 
relied upon the judgment and have not changed their position 
based upon the judgment. A party can make a motion for a new 
trial within ten days, appeal within thirty days and make a 
motion under Rule 60(b)(1-4) within three months. During this 
time frame the scales are in favor of allowing an inequitable 
judgment to be set aside before the parties have had time to 
significantly change their positions. But as more time passes 
the scale gradually tips in favor of the finality of judgments 
and only a few narrow reasons will allow a judgment to be set 
aside. The last resort for one who desires to set aside a 
judgment is subsection (7), and this is for those extraordinary 
circumstances not contemplated by the other subsections. Then, 
after passage of a reasonable time all avenues of relief are at 
an end. Due to Chapman's lack of diligence, the scales have 
tipped in favor of finality and Chipman's motions were properly 
denied. 
POINT III 
UTAH CASELAW SUPPORTS THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DECISION. 
Chipman filed its motions some 14 months after the stipula-
tion and judgment were entered by the parties and the Court. In 
Johnson v. Peoples' Finance & Thrift Co., 2 Utah 2d 246, 272 P.2d 
171 (1954), a quiet title action was settled by the parties at a 
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pretrial conference. After eight months had elapsed counsel for 
defendants filed a judgment with the court which purportedly 
embodied the terms of the stipulation. Plaintiff objected to the 
proposed judgment and it was not signed at that time. A few 
weeks later, plaintiff moved the court to set aside the stipula-
tion made at the pretrial conference. The motion was based upon 
the ground that the stipulation was entered into improvidently, 
inadvertently and mistakenly and on the grounds that the enforce-
ment thereof would work an injustice and that said stipulation 
was entered into under mistake of fact which if enforced would 
amount to constructive fraud against the plaintiffs. In support 
of the motion, plaintiffs filed an affidavit which set out 
specifically the matters about which they claimed they were 
mistaken at the time of the pretrial conference. The Court 
denied the motion and signed a judgment which purportedly 
embodied the terms of the stipulation made at the pretrial 
conference and other terms stipulated to by the parties at a 
subsequent hearing. The plaintiffs appealed contending that the 
judgment below did not comport with the terms of the stipulations 
and that the lower court abused its discretion in denying their 
motion to set aside the stipulation. 
In affirming the judgment of the court below, the Supreme 
Court stated: 
Even if we were to assume that the facts alleged in the 
plaintiffs1 affidavit are true, the trial court would 
have been within its bounds of discretion in denying 
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the motion to vacate in view of the fact that the 
motion was not made until over nine months after the 
stipulation was entered into. Applications for relief 
from stipulations must be seasonably made, 
272 P.2d at 173 (citation omitted), (emphasis added). 
Because Chipman's motions were filed five months later than 
the motion filed in the Johnson case, Chipman's motions were, 
likewise, not "seasonably made." 
In the case of Dove v. Cude, 710 P.2d 170 (Utah 1985), the 
defendants appealed an order of the trial court granting plain-
tiff's motion to withdraw a stipulation. In reversing the trial 
courtfs action, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
We have previously stated that parties are bound 
by their stipulations unless relieved therefrom by the 
court, which has the power to set aside a stipulation 
entered into inadvertently or for justifiable cause. 
It is unlikely that a stipulation signed by counsel and 
filed with the court was entered into advertently. 
Further, although the trial court has certain discre-
tion in providing relief from a stipulation, if timely 
requested, ordinarily courts are bound by stipulations 
between parties. In this case, there is no indication 
that the trial court found as a matter of fact that 
plaintiff did not understand or agree to the stipula-
tion; nor did the trial court ground its decision to 
permit withdrawal of the stipulation on any legal or 
equitable basis. In the absence of any articulated 
"justifiable cause" we must reverse the withdrawal of 
the stipulation. 
Id. at 171 (citations omitted). 
In this case, Chipman's application was not timely 
requested, nor does the record indicate any justifiable cause to 
set aside the judgment or the stipulation. Even if Chipman can 
establish that he did not understand the stipulation he certainly 
agreed to it, through his counsel. 
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In Laub v. South Central Utah Telephone Association, Inc., 
657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982), defendant moved to modify a final 
judgment which had, six months earlier, been approved as to form 
and content and fully satisfied by a third party. Defendant made 
the motion based on subdivisions (6) and (7) of Rule 60(b). The 
court found that subdivision (6) did not apply to the circum-
stances of the case. Although the court expressed some reserva-
tion that the motion was appropriate under subdivision (7), it 
held that even if it were appropriate, it did not justify relief 
because of the six month delay. Specifically, the court stated 
that the six month delay and the fact that the judgment had been 
satisfied showed the motion was not made within a reasonable 
time. The court stated, "We do consider the fact of prior 
satisfaction an important consideration in determining whether 
the motion to modify was made within a reasonable time period. 
The possibility of prejudice to the non-moving party increases 
significantly when the judgment has already been paid." id. at 
1307. In this case, the Richinses and the Porters have per-
formed, pursuant to the stipulation, for over a year. 
Substantial sums of money have been paid by the Richinses to the 
Porters, including sums which were paid for the benefit of 
Chipman. Also, the requisite transfers of permits have taken 
place. 
The case at bar is similar to that of Robinson v. E.P. 
Dutton & Co., 45 F.R.D. 360 (D. N.Y. S.D. 1968). In that case, 
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plaintiff moved to vacate a settlement order that had been 
entered in a copyright infringement action. The district court, 
in holding that the motion which was made ten months after the 
settlement, was untimely, stated: 
Obviously/ a party is not free to settle a case 
and then reopen it when an additional term . . . is 
demanded by one party but not accepted by the other. 
To do otherwise would make a mockery of the doctrine of 
finality. 
Plaintiff's affidavit which is at great variance 
with his counsel's, states that he always demanded 
defendant's promise not to infringe and that his 
counsel had no authority to settle unless such a pro-
mise was included in the settlement. An allegation of 
settlement of an action without authority normally 
entitles a party to reopen the judgment. Not every 
action settled without authority, however, will be 
reopened. The motion to reopen must be made within a 
reasonable time period. 
This motion was made ten months after the entry of 
the stipulation of discontinuance. Plaintiff knew 
every moment of this long period that this action had 
been discontinued. He consulted with several outside 
attorneys about the settlement and his rights. Yet he 
never moved to set aside the judgment until now. It is 
no excuse to cite his correspondence with his retained 
counsel. We find the delay of ten months is unreason-
able and inexcusable. 
The Robinson case is quite similar to this except there was 
a longer lapse of time in this case. Likewise, Chipman's motion 
is untimely and should be denied. 
Chipman relies on the cases of Stewart v. Sullivan, 29 Utah 
2d 741, 506 P.2d 74 (1973) and Nev v. Harrison, 5 Utah 2d 217# 
299 P.2d 1114 (1956)/ to "support both the substance and timing 
of Chipman's motions." The Stewart case does not support the 
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proposition advanced by Chipman and the Nev case was, in effect, 
overruled in Estate of Pepper, 711 P.2d 261 (Utah 1985). 
The Stewart case held that the provisions of Rule 60(b)(7) 
are sufficiently broad to permit the court to set aside a former 
order which appeared to have been entered upon an erroneous 
assumption. The erroneous assumption that was made by the court 
and counsel for one of the defendants was that an order of 
dismissal had been made without prejudice, when in fact it was 
with prejudice. While it is true that plaintiff's counsel had 
failed to respond to interrogatories and the complaint was 
dismissed upon that basis, the court noted that plaintiff had 
responded to substantially similar interrogatories in a companion 
case which was later consolidated with the case that was dis-
missed. Because of the consolidation the Court discounted the 
importance of the fact that the first set of interrogatories had 
not been answered, therefore the issue of effectiveness of 
counsel, had no real impact on the Court's opinion. Chipman has 
misunderstood the holding of the Stewart case. 
Chipman argues that the Nev case holds that Rule 60(b)(7) 
was intended to govern cases where equity and fairness dictate 
that a party should be relieved from a judgment entered against 
an unrepresented party who mistakenly believes she was protected. 
In Estate of Pepper, similar reliance was placed upon the Nev 
case by the movants and the Court quickly dispatched with that 
argument by stating: 
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Whatever ambiguity may have been created by that case 
(the Nev case) has been clarified by our later case 
law. If a party's grounds are properly encompassed 
within those four subsections (1-4), he cannot avoid 
the 3 month limitation by employing the "catch all" 
subsection 7." 
Id. at 263. Chipman's reliance on the Stewart and Nev cases is 
clearly misplaced. And, if Chipman is to obtain relief, it must 
come under Rule 60(b)(1). 
POINT IV 
CHIPMAN RATIFIED THE JUDGMENT BY HIS ACTIONS 
EVEN IF HE DID NOT ORIGINALLY AGREE TO IT.4 
It has been stated that "[a] contract which is voidable for 
lack of consent may, however, be ratified by subsequent consent." 
Houk v. Williams Bros., 137 P.2d 737, 740 (Cal. App. 1943). See 
also, Michel v. ICN Pharmaceuticals Inc., 549 P.2d 519 (Ore. 
1976). The Supreme Court of this state acknowledged this rule in 
Davton v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 635 P.2d 801 (Utah 1961) by stat-
ing: 
Appellant, by continuing in the performance of the 
subcontract after being advised that his original under-
standing of its terms was not correct, adopted the con-
tract even if it could have been found, which we doubt, 
that no contract had been executed because of a lack of 
meeting of the minds between the contracting parties. 
Id. at 802. 
Chipman accepted the benefits of the stipulation and judg-
ment, including a substantial payment to himself, and thereby 
4This point was addressed by counsel for the Porters at the 
hearing on June 8, 1989. (R. 664). 
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ratified the settlement, even if he did not originally agree to 
it. His action, or nonaction, in not protesting the settlement 
allowed the Porters and the Richinses to change their respective 
positions in reliance upon the stipulation.5 He should not, at 
this late date, and after accepting the benefits of the stipula-
tion, be allowed to attack it. 
POINT V 
A REVERSAL AND REMAND WILL NOT RESULT IN ANY 
EQUITABLE RESOLUTION OF THE CLAIMS BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES. 
At the trial of this matter the plaintiffs put on their case 
in chief and then the settlement was effected. Chipman had not 
yet put on any evidence. Chipman is now deceased. As a 
practical matter there is nothing that can now be done in the 
case, because Chipman can no longer provide testimony or even 
state what he thought the original settlement was, or enter into 
a different settlement. There would be no way the trial court 
could undo what has been done and either retry the case or 
refashion the settlement. 
Pursuant to the stipulation, the Richinses, in order to 
satisfy the judgment the Porters were granted against Chipman, 
agreed to pay Porters substantial amounts of money and Porters 
conveyed to the Richins their interest in the permits they had 
purchased from Chipman. Chipman also received a sizeable payment 
from the Richinses for the grazing permits. (R. 206-212). 
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CONCLUSION 
Because Chipman has not shown in any fashion, that the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying Chipman*s motion to set 
aside the judgment, the court's order of October 4, 1989 should 
be affirmed. 
DATED this y\\ ^ day of J^W/whO^ 1990. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By £ • /lj 
GebrgefA. Hunt 
Ryan (El Tibbitts 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Appellees Porters 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
DENNIS J. RICHINS ET AL, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
Civil No. Cy-B7-$07;6-
STIPULATION TRANSCRIPT 
DELBERT CHIPMAN ET AL, 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on Monday, the 21st day of 
December, 1987, the STIPULATION in the above-entitled 
matter was taken by Richard C. Tatton, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah,, 
before the Honorable Boyd L. Park, at the Utah County 
Courthouse, Provo, Utah 84601 
5 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff: Mr. Jim Brown 
Attorney at Law 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
For the Defendant Chipman: Mr, Noall Wootton 
Attorney at Law 
American Fork, Utah 
For the Defendant Porters: Mr. George Hunt 
Attorney at Law 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
P R O C ^ E D I ^ N G ^ S 
THE COURT: All right counsel I understand 
that you have reached a stipulation and an agreement 
in this matter? 
MR. BROWN: I think we have Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Congratulations, I compliment 
everybody. 
MR. BROWN: For the record perhaps I could re 
it into the record and then if there are any, if I hav 
1 
1 misstated something or we need to make sure it is 
2 accurate please correct me. 
3 First of all Exhibit "A" to the Complaint the Sale 
4 and Lease Agreement would be and is the agreement between 
5 the parties with the exception, of some modifications. 
6 The modifications are as follows: One that the 
7 option given to John Todd Chipman is to be removed and 
8 that the lease provision would be a five year base with 
9 one three year option of Mr. Richins to exercise with 
10 the second option for an additional two year period for tot|al 
11 of ten years. 
THE COURT: Total of ten? 
13 I MR. BROWN: Yes Your Honor, five year base, first 
14 option for three year period, second option would be for 
15 a two year period. 
lg THE COURT: I thought you said the first two 
17 and the second. 
18 MR. BROWN: Yes and the first year of the lease h^s 
19 in fact gone and would be affective as of the date of 
20 the original agreement of October 1986. 
21 THE COURT: All right. 
22 MR. BROWN: All right the second modification wo\Jil< 
23 be that there will be a reduction of the payments of $3600j0 
24 which would be paid directly to the Deer Creek Land & 
25 Livestock and that would be a reduction on a semiannual 
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payment. The payments are due on December the 15th 
and April the 15th of the respective periods and so there 
would be a $1800.00 reduction from that. 
Third modification would be that the Richinsiparties 
would be entitled to run up to 100 head of cattle and 
would be able to be raising or grazing those animals 
in the Barth Field Pasture area. 
The next modification is that Mr. Chipman would be 
given access so long as the access would not interfere 
with the grazing rights of the Richins and that if 
this access is for the purpose of perhaps Geothermal 
Exploration or whatever but that if in fact any grazing 
rights were diminished or lost as a result of this access 
that Mr. Richins would have the grazing rights replaced 
satisfactorily to him or an adjustment in the lease 
payments would be made at the option of Mr. Richins. 
He would have the option to either have Mr. Chipman replace) 
the grazing or a reduction in the payments. 
Further that the payments would now be $21,500.00 
per annual installment, semiannual installment in 
December the 15th and April the 15th of each year with a 
further reduction of course $1800.00 off from that which 
would be paid directly to the Deer Creek Land & Livestock 
Company. 
So the annual installments would be $19,700.00 
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semiannual installments of $19,700.00. That would be 
subject to one further modification and that is if 
in fact the Pine Hollow is not transferred and is in fact 
going to cancel then there would be an additional 
reduction of $11,520.00 for that reduction and that would 
be done on a semiannual payment basis as well. 
MR. W00TT0N: That is $11,000.00 a year? 
MR. BROWN: $11,520.00 per year or $5,765.00 
per semiannual payment. 
MR. W00TT0N: Okay. 
MR. BROWN: The Porters would be awarded a Judgmen 
against Chipman in the amount of $20,000.00 and that would 
be paid at the rate of $4,000.00 per semiannual installmenti 
directly from Mr. Richins as long as those payments were 
made thru the April 1990 installment of $4,000.00 per 
payment then that would satisfy that Judgment in full. 
If the payments were missed for whatever reasons then they 
would have the balance of their Judgment which was not 
paid up to that time. 
THE COURT: No execution as long as the payments 
were made timely? 
MR. BROWN: Correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BROWN: Then finally Mr. Richins would not 
owe the $21,000.00 for the 1986 payments that would be 
forgiven as part of the damages 
Any amount of $40,000.00 of 
awarded to Mr. Richins. 
offset , additional 
offset damages that were not paid via the reduction in 
: payments and the Richins failed to exercise the first three 
year option would then be deducted from the last 
! installment in it would be 1993 
correct, pardon me 1991 it would 
reduction would be made. 
MR. CHIPMAN: Jim is it 
to him? 
MR. BROWN: Well let me 
on the record and then. 
Also one other modification 
remember and that is that on the 
I think I hope that is 
be in 1991 when that 
okay if I say anything 
see if I can get it 
which I failed to 
default provisions that 
if the payment is not made the on the timely basis with 
the 30 day notice that the lease 
Mr. Chipman. 
That the payment agreements 
with the monies that are in the 
There are two installments 
the Clerk of the Court. One in 
maybe cancelled by 
are as follows now 
court. 
that are deposited with 
the amount of $30,000.00 
and that is to be paid to Porters and Porters in turn 
! upon payment of that $30,000.00 
Richins both permits that they 
Chi pman. 
is to convey to 
have received from 
6 
The remaining $24,000.00 payment is to be paid 
as follows: $4,000.00 to Porters by way of partial 
satisfaction of the $20,000.00 Judgment. $15,700.00 
to Chipman and the balance is to be disburs 
Richins and he inturn may disburse that in 
wishes to see fit 
For the record I will indicate that we 
,ed to Mr. 
any manner he 
\ are going to pu 
$4300.00 additional payment to Porters on the second 
payment of the permit and in April of 1988 
upon whether or not the Pine Hollow Permit 
we will pay $19,700.00 and of that $19,70C 
$4,000.00 will be paid to Porters and of th 
remaining , $11,520.00 maybe offset in the 
Pine Hollow is not transferable, if it is 
and usable by Mr. Richins he will pay the 
$15,700.00 otherwise he will pay $4,180.00 
depending 
can be transfers 
LOO, 
le $15,700.00 
\ event that 
transferable 
total 
in April of 
1988 to Mr. Chipman. That would be the remaining payment i 
in the November of 1988 the balance of $30, 
payment for the second permit will be paid 
and the $19,700.00 payment less the appropr 
if in fact $5,765.00 for Pine Hollow in the 
| the Pine Hollow is not transferable again 
be the semiannual installments thereafter. 
I think I have stated it accurately. 
any modifications? 
000.00 total 
to Porters 
iate offset 
event 
and that would 
Are there 
7 
MR. WOOTTON: We were going to put a provision in 
Mr. Brown that allowed for the cancellation of the lease 
if the payments weren't timely made? 
THE COURT: 30 days. 
MR. BROWN: Yes upon 30 days notice I thought 
I said that ? 
MR. WOOTTON: I must have missed that. 
MR. BROWN: But that is correct. 
THE COURT: He said if they are not paid 
within 30 days of date then Mr. Chipman has the right 
to cancel. 
MR. WOOTTON: That was our understanding. 
MR. BROWN: That is correct. 
MR. HUNT: Your Honor just for the purposes 
of clarification I think to the extent the record 
needs to straighten this out. The intention of the Porters 
is simply to assign to Mr. and Mrs. Richins everything 
that they have acquired under their agreement with 
Mr. Chipman and his corporation and for that amount 
they will give the $30,000.00 payment that is now in court 
and then the balance next November unless the Pine Hollow 
Permit fails and then we will give a part of it in 
April and this has been the subject of a draft agreement 
that Mr. Brown and I have already exchanged previously 
and I think that we pretty well agreed on the foremat 
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12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
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21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
there so with that modification with respect to the 
April Payment I think I wanted the record to reflect 
what we had worked those terms out. 
MR. BROWN: That is correct. Let me put on the 
record that in the event that the Pine Hollow payment is nq 
the Pine Hollow Permit is not transferred then we would 
have additional monies due in April that will be due to 
the Porters. 
MR. HUNT: With that I agree to the stipulation. 
MR. W00TT0N: Mr. Chipman you have been in 
court and listened to that stipulation have you not sir? 
MR. CHIPMAN: What Stipulation. 
MR. W00TT0N: The one Mr. Brown just stated into 
the record? 
MR. CHIPMAN: Well I don't understand it. 
MR. W00TT0N: Well have you been in here and you 
understand it? j 
MR. CHIPMAN: I have been in here a long time 
and I don't quite understand it but I guess it is all right] 
Mr. W00TT0N: All right Mr. Osterthorpe 
you are Mr. Chipman's friend? 
MR. OSTERTHORPE: Yes. 
MR. W00TT0N: Yc-u have been in the courtroom and 
heard it too? 
MR. OSTERTHORPE: Yes. 
t , 
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MR. 
MR. 
MR. 
THE 
WOOTTON: And do you think it is reasonable? 
0STERTH0RPE: Yes. 
WOOTTON: That is all. 
COURT: Okay Mr. Richins you also have 
heard this have you not? 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
MR. 
THE 
RICHINS: Yes. 
COURT: And your wife is she here also? 
RICHINS: Yes. 
BROWN: Yes she is here too Your Honor. 
COURT: And both of you understand this 
agreement and are willing to be bound by it? 
MR. 
MRS 
THE 
courtroom as 
by Mr. Brown 
MR. 
MR. 
MR. 
going to pay 
MR. 
MR. 
RICHINS: Yes. 
. RICHINS: Yes. 
COURT: Mr. Porter you were present in the 
well and you heard the agreement as recited 
and you understand that? 
RICHARD PORTER: Yes. 
KENNETH PORTER: Yes I understand it. 
RICHARD PORTER: I am just wondering who is 
the interest on that? 
HUNT: That is in the written agreement. 
RICHARD PORTER: I didn't hear the 
question. If that is in there why that is fine. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: I suppose this is in the agreement? 
HUNT: It is in the agreement that Mr. Brown 
ID" 
1 and I have exchanged and we had some discussions and we 
2 adjusted the rate and I think we understand that. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 So you are willing to be bound by this agreement 
5 subject to the drafting agreement that your counsel and 
6 Mr. Brown have entered into I take it? 
7 MR. RICHARD PORTER: Yes. 
8 J MR. KENNETH PORTER: Yes. 
9 THE COURT: All right the court finds that the 
10 stipulation is fair and accurate and approve the same 
11 arid Mr. Brown if you will prepare the necessary Order 
12 for the court to sign in this regard and submit 
13 it to Mr. Hunt and Mr. Wootton for approval as to form j 
14 then we will get this case over with. 
15 MR. WOOTTON: Thank you Your Honor. 
16 MR. HUNT; Thank you Your Honor. 
17 MR, BROWN: Thank you Your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Again let me compliment each of you 
19 and thank you for the hard work you put in and I know this 
20 I has been a very difficult and tedious case and required 
21 a lot of hard work for settlement. I still believe this is 
22 the best answer to this case thank you again. You have 
23 all done a fine job. If nothing further Court will be 
24 in recess. 
25 THE BAILIFF: Everyone please arise, Court will be 
11 
5J 
1 in recess. 
2 (WHEREUPON, the Stipulation was concluded) 
3 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
• s s « 
COUNTY OF WASATCH ) 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the STIPULATION was 
reported by me in Stenotype, and thereafter caused by me 
to be transcribed into typewriting by Richard C. Tatton 
and that a full, true and correct transcription of said 
STIPULATION was so taken. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not of kin or 
otherwise associated with any of the parties to said cause 
of action and that I am not interested in the event 
of action and that I am not interested in the event 
thereof. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal at Midway, 
Utah, this ^l day of December, 1987. 
RICHARD C. TATTON, CSR 
My commission expires: 
June 15, 1989 
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ADDENDUM 2 
Stipulation for Settlement and Judgment 
F:;-F:3 . 
JAMES R. BROWN (#456) 
JARD1NE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS J. RICHINS and 
SUESANN RICHINS, 
) STIPULATION FOR SETTLEMENT 
Plaintiffs, ) AND JUDGMENT 
vs. ) 
DELBERT CHIPMAN & SONS CO., ) 
INC., D. RAY CHIPMAN, ) 
Individually, RICHARD PORTER, ) 
KENNETH PORTER and JOHN DOES ) 
1 through 10, ) Civil No. CV-87-1076 
Defendants. ) Judge Boyd L. Park 
COMES NOW Plaintiffs, by and through James R. Brown, 
Esq. of Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown & Dunn; Defendants Chipmans, 
by and through Noall T. Wootton, Esq. of Wootton & Smith; 
Defendants-Crossclaimants Porters, by and through George S. 
Hunt, Esq. of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, and stipulate as 
follows: 
1. Exhibit "A" to Plaintiffs' Complaint is in full 
force and effect as per its terms except as herein modified. 
2. Exhibit "A" is modified as per the attached copy 
of Exhibit "A" to this Stipulation. 
K S JAM -6 Fit 2 OS 
3. Judgment may be entered against Defendants 
Chipmans in favor of Crossclaimants Porters in the amount of 
$20,000, the same to bear interest at the rate of twelve 
percent (12%) per annum from date hereof. However, no 
execution may issue provided Chipmans cause the following 
payments to be made thereon: 
a. Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000) from the funds 
on deposit with the Court. 
b. Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000) from the 
semi-annual payments from Richins on: April 15, 1988, 
December 15, 1988, April 15, 1989 and December 15, 
1989. 
c. If all of the foregoing payments are timely 
made, Porters will execute a satisfaction of the 
judgment. In the event that any payment is not made 
upon 35-day written notice from Porters to Chipmans, 
Porters may execute on any remaining unpaid amount of 
the judgment together with the accumulated interest. 
4. Chipmans may have up to December 15, 1989 to 
protect, appeal and/or take any other steps to establish an 
appropriate transfer to Richins of the Pine Hollow permit. 
Richins agree to pay Chipmans $30,000 for the Pine Hollow 
permit if the same can be transferred without diminution. 
5. Under the provisions of paragraph 2.8 of the 
Agreement, Richins are entitled to an offset of $11,520 per 
-2-
year, the same to be withheld from the semi-annual lease 
payments for each year Richins are unable to use the Pine 
Hollow permit. Provided, however, that a partial reduction 
in the use of the Pine Hollow permit shall result in a 
partial reduction of the set-off calculated at the rate of 
$9.60 per head that the quota is reduced. 
6. There is on deposit with the Clerk of the Court 
the total sum of $54,000. Those funds shall be paid to the 
following parties as soon as possible: 
a. $34,000 to Porters representing $30,000 
payment in full for the Tooth Springs permit; $4,000 payment 
toward satisfaction of the Porter judgment. 
b. $15,700 to Chipmans and to Chipmans1 attorney 
representing full payment through the December 15, 1987 semi-
annual lease payment. 
c. $4,300 to be paid to Porters as an advance 
payment on the Mill Canyon permit. 
7. In the event that Chipmans cannot absolutely 
assure Richins of the use of the Pine Hollow permit for the 
summer of 1988, Richins will pay the following sum to Chipmans 
on or before April 15, 1988: 
a. $4,000 to Porters with credit being given 
by Chipmans on the semi-annual lease payment. 
b. $4,180 to Chipmans as full payment of the 
April 1988 lease payment. 
In the event that Richins are given the full use of Pine Hollow 
permit for the summer of 1988, Richins will pay to Chipman the 
-3-
additional sum of $11,520. 
8. Richins is granted as damages against Chlpmans 
the following: 
a. An offset of $21,000 representing the 1986 
December lease payment. 
b. The sum of $2,500 per semi-annual payment 
commencing December 1987 for a period of nine years. 
c. In the event that Richins, at his option, does 
not exercise the First Option to renew the lease in December 
1991, then Richins may offset the additional sum of $20,000 
from the April 1990 and December 1990 payments, 
d. In the event that Richins, at his option, 
does not exercise the Second Option to renew in 1994, then 
Richins may offset the additional sum of $10,000 from the 
April 1993 and December 1992 payments. 
9. Richins may pay direct any leases to the lessor 
and credit will be given to any installment due under the 
semi-annual payments provided in the Sale and Lease Agreement. 
10. Each party is to bear their own attorneys' fees 
and costs as the same has been calculated within the damages 
awarded and agreed upon herein. 
11. Porters agree to sell and Richins agree to 
purchase by way of assignment the Tooth Springs and Mill Canyon 
permits and said purchase is without prejudice as to the 
provisions contained in Exhibit "A" hereto. 
-4-
o r 
DATED this 
JRB-P1510 
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2 Of; 
As day of December, 1987. 
,JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, Bj & DUNN 
Attorneys tor Plaintiff 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
GEORGE S. 
Attorneys 
WOOTTON & SMITH 
•&$J£i 
Porters 
NOALL T. WOOTTC 
Attorneys for Chipmans 
ADDENDUM 3 
Judgment on Stipulation 
r^tU tr.\ 
JAMES R. BROWN (#456) 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS J. RICHINS and 
SUESANN RICHINS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DELBERT CHIPMAN Sc SONS CO., 
INC., D. RAY CHIPMAN, 
Individually, RICHARD PORTER, 
KENNETH PORTER and JOHN DOES 
1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT ON STIPULATION 
Civil No. CV-87-1076 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the 
Honorable Boyd L. Park on the 21st day of December, 1987. The 
parties being present and represented by counsel of record, and 
the Court having taken some evidence and the parties thereafter 
entered into a Stipulation for Settlement on the record which 
has been reduced to writing, and for good cause appearing, 
therefor, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Crossclaimants 
Porters have and are hereby awarded judgment against Defendant 
Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., Inc. in the amount of $20,000, the 
same to bear interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per 
annum from date hereof until paid. It is further, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Porters cannot 
execute upon said judgment provided the installments are paid 
in accordance with the Stipulation of the parties. However, in 
the event that the payments are not met timely and after a 
35-day written notice within which to cure said default, 
Porters may execute on the balance of said judgment together 
with accumulated interest thereon. It is further, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Exhibit MAM 
attached hereto is deemed to be a fully executed contract 
between Plaintiff and Defendant Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., 
Inc. and that Plaintiff is entitled to specific performance 
under the terms and provisions of the Sale and Lease Agreement, 
Exhibit "A". It is further, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff have and 
is hereby granted as damages for failure of Defendant Delbert 
Chipman & Sons Co., Inc. past non-performance the following: 
a. $21,000 credit for the December 1986 lease 
payment; 
-2-
b. An offset of $2,500 on all semi-annual 
payments commencing December 1987 and thereafter for a 
period of nine years (a total of $45,000). 
It is further, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that each party is to 
bear their own attorneys' fees and costs. It is further, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Stipulation in 
open Court and that which appears in written form is 
incorporated into and made a part of this Judgment as if fully 
set out herein. 
. i£> /fSY 
DATED t h i s day o 
BY THE COURT: 
. - — > 
-BOYEKL. PARK 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
WOOTTON & SMITH 
By. 
NOALL T. WOOTTON 
Attorneys for Chipmans 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By. 
GEORGE S. HU 
Attorneys foi jforters 
JRB-P1511 •3-
ADDENDUM 4 
Order Granting Plaintifffs Motion to Strike Defendants Delbert 
Chipman & Sons, Inc. and D. Ray Chipman's Motion to Enforce 
Termination of Lease Pursuant to stipulation, in Court or, in the 
alternative, to Set Aside or to Reform Stipulation 
RAUK J. MARSH, ESQ. A2092 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., 
Inc., and D. Ray Chipaan 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 531-8300 
W 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE P0URIH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
********** 
DENNIS J. RICKCNS an* 
SUESANN RICHINS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
DE BERT CHIEMAN & SONS 0 0 . , INC., 
D. RAY CHIH4AN, ind iv idua l ly , 
KENNETH PORTER, 
through 10, 
Defendants. 
RICHARD PORTER, 
and JOHN DOES 1 
(»PER (gRANTO*; ftAIflror'ff M3TECN 
TO yiyiKE jjKf uiDftNIS DELBERT 
CfflPtAN & gCflS, INC, WD D. PAY 
gfljMAy's vow** TO ismx*£ 
ffRflWKW QF IgASE fURSOANr TO 
gTEKJLAIICN. IN OCURT CR. IN THE 
ATrrwaq^riVE, TO SET ASIDE CR TO 
HETOBM gnroiATION 
Civil No. CV87-1076 
(Judge Boyd L. Park) 
********** 
Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendants1 Motions for lack of 
jurisdiction under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure came on 
for hearing before the Honorable Boyd L. Park on the 8th day of June, 
1989. Plaintiffs were present in person and represented by counsel of 
record, Jaires R. Brcwn, Esq., of Jardine, Iinebau#i, Brcwn & IXmn. 
Defendants Delbert Chipman & Sons, Inc. and D. Ray Chipraan were present 
and represented by counsel of record, Ralph J. Marsh, Esq., of Backman, 
Clark & Marsh. Defendants Richard Porter and Kenneth Porter were not 
page 2 
present, but were represented by counsel of record, George A. Hunt, Esq., 
of Snow, Qiristensen & Martineau. Ihe Oourt hearing oral argument by the 
respective parties and being fully apprised in the premises and for good 
cause appearing, it is hereby: 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Defendants aiipmans1 
Motions are properly under Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure arti roust be brought within three months after the judgment was 
entered. Defendants Chiproans' Motions were not filed within the three 
month period and this Court is without jurisdiction to hear the motions. 
It is further, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED this Order Striking the 
Defendants1 Motions is a final order frcro which an appeal lies, if any 
party desires to appeal. ^ ^;^"; 
DAUD this j^==£7day of Ccpteniber, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
By 
Boyd L. Park 
District Oourt Judge 
ADDENDUM 5 
Suggestion of Death on the Record 
George A. Hunt 
SNOW, CKRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Richard Porter and 
Kenneth Porter 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS J 
RICHINS, 
RICHINS and SUESANN 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
vs. 
DELBERT CHIPMAN & SONS CO., 
INC. and D. RAY CHIPMAN, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
RICHARD PORTER and KENNETH 
PORTER, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
Defendants and 
Appellants, 
SUGGESTION OF DEATH 
ON THE RECORD 
Case No. 890466 
Pursuant to Rule 38(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, notice is hereby given that Appellant D. Ray Chipman is 
deceased and no longer a proper party to this action. 
day of January, 1990. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
George A, RuiVt 
Attorneys \op Defendants and 
Appellants Richard Porter and 
Kenneth Porter 
-2-
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Kay I. Brown, being duly sworn, says tbat she is employed by 
the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for 
Respondents Richard Porter and Kenneth Porter herein; that she 
served the attached Suggestion of Death on the Record (Case Number 
890466, Supreme Court of the State of Utah) upon the parties listed 
below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope 
addressed to: 
Ralph J. Marsh 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
James R. Brown 
Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown & Dunn 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on 
the 5th day of January, 1990. 
(^\U /frrM 
Kay l^'Brown 
V 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 5th day of January, 
1990. 
My Commission Expire, 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
siding in the State of Uath 
ADDENDUM 6 
Affidavit of Noall T. Wootton in Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
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F I L E D 
Fourth Judicial District Court of 
Utah County. Stale of Utah. 
C A ^ M A ' B . ' S M I T H Clerk 
4*" 
- Deputy 
NOALL T. W00TT0N -- #3554 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 310 
American Fork, UT 84003-0310 
Telephone: (801) 756-3576 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS J. RICHINS and 
SUESANN RICHINS, 
Plaintiffs, 
j! V S . 
DELBERT CHIPMAN & SONS CO., 
INC., D. RAY CHIPMAN, 
Individually, RICHARD PORTER, 
KENNETH PORTER and JOHN DOES 
1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF NOALL T. WOOTTON 
IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION 
Civil No. CV-87-1076 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
I S S 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
COMES NOW, Noall T. Wootton, Esq., and having been duly 
sworn, deposes and states: 
1. Affiant was counsel of record representing 
Defendants Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., Inc., and D. Ray Chipman, 
individually, hereinafter "Chipman" in the trial in the above-
entitled matter for a period of time after the conclusion of the 
trial. 
2z 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
6 
9 
10 
11 
12 
- * s 
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8 ° s £ 
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2. Affiant ie competent to testify of the matters 
contained herein and are based Upon his personal knowledge. 
3- Prior to the trial, Chipman visited affiant on 
many occasions, which resulted in extended negotiations and 
proposed amendments to the Sale and Lease Agreement between 
Chipman and Richins. 
4. At some point, Richins filed the above-entitled 
lawsuit and affiant herein acted as counsel for Chipman. 
5. Affiant was not under the influence of alcohol at 
any time during the trial or during negotiations which led Up to 
Y6 'the Stipulation for Settlement and Judgment (hereinafter "Judgment"' 
14 |, 6. On the 21st dat of December 1987, Chipman, Porters, 
15 Richins and their respective counsel entered into discussions 
16 I about possible settlement. These discussions lased for at least 
17 I one and one-half hours or more. 
7. Chipman had a confidant, Doctor Osguthorpe, and the 
discussions, proposals and counter proposals were all discussed 
with Chipman and Osguthorpe. 
8. Osguthorpe was there at the request of Chipman and 
affiant to be a witness on Chipman's behalf. At some point in 
time during the discussions leading up to the Judgment, there 
remained only two issues not acceptable to Chipman. Tose issues 
were : 
a) A ten year term for the lease; 
•2-
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 i 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
e 
9 
b) Allowing up to 100 head of cattle to be on the 
ground. 
9. Dr. Osguthorpe, In the presence of affiant, advised 
Chipman to accept the 10 year term and to allow up to 100 head of 
cattle, which cattle grazing had been historically done Under 
Chipman's management. 
10. Affiant, with Dr. Osguthorpe and Chipman, discussed 
10 land explained at length and in detail: 
11 ; a) The forgiveness of $21,000 payment by way of 
part of the damages due RichinS; 12 
13 | b) the reduction of the semi-annual installment 
i 
14 ! to $19,700; 
i 
15 I c) the lease would be for a 10-year period; 
16 
17 
18 
15 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
d) Richins could run up to 100 head of cattle; 
e) there would be payments made to Porter instead 
of Chipman for the purchase price of the two permits; 
f) Porters would be awarded judgment of $20,000 
with no execution on the Judgment as long as Richins 
paid $4,000 per semi-annual payment directly to Porters-, 
g) Richins would be awarded additional damages to 
be withheld at the rate of $2,500 per semi-annual lease 
payment; 
2 5
 I h) That Exhibit "A" to the complaint would be 
26 rewritten to reflect the changes agreed to and attached 
-3-
to the Stipulation for Settlement and Judgment; 
1) Porters, Upon receipt of $30,000 of the $54,000 
which had been paid into the Court, would convey and 
assign over to Rlchlns both of the permits which Chipman 
sold to Porters; 
j) $15,700 was to be paid to Chipman; 
k) $4,300 would be paid as a pre-payment to 
Porters on the remaining balance for the two permits; 
1) there was the possibility that the Pine Hollow 
permit would be cancelled by the Forest Department. If 
the Pine Hollow permit was not c ncelled, Richins would 
pay Chipman for Pine Hollow last; 
m) if Pine Hollow was cancelled, there would be 
an offset of $11,520 (anually), which would be deducted 
for the grazing year (Fall 1987 and Spring of 1988) from 
the April 1988 payment; 
n) if the Pine Hollow permit was only partially 
cancelled, there would be a pro-rata reduction on the 
basis of $9.60 per head; 
o) Chipman was given until December 15, 1989 to 
protest, appeal or take whatever other 6teps he desired 
to make available to Richins the Pine Hollow permit, and 
he Xv*as so advised by Affiant. He did not do so. 
-4-
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z 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
p) Richins may pay direct the lease payments to 
BLM, State Land, U.S. Forest and/or private third party 
lessors and deduct said payments from the $19,700 
semi-annual payments; 
q) in the event that the U.S. Forest Department 
6 I cancelled the entire Pine Hollow permit, there would 
li 
9 be a further reduction of the semi-annual lease payment 
10 J, of $5,760 for the remianing period; 
11 I r) there would be a written Stipulation for 
12 i Settlement to be prepared by Mr. Brown; 
13 | s) Chipman could terminate the lease if Richins 
i 
14 did not pay the lease payments timely, but after a 30-
15 J day notice in writing was sent to Richins. 
16 [ 11. At the conclusion of going over the elements in 
17 paragraph 10 above with Dr. Osguthorpe, Dr. Osguthorpe advised 
18 Chipman to take the proposed offer of settlement. Chipman then 
1 9 I told affiant "settle.M 
2 0
 12. Affiant was authorized "to settle" the case upon 
21 J the terms of paragraph 10. 
13. Affiant, at the conclusion of the Stipulation, was 
read into the record inquired of Chipman: 
%4 MR. W00TT0N: Mr. Chipman you have been in 
court and listened to that stipulation have 
2w/
 J you not sir? 
26 ' 
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MR. CHIPMAN: What stipulation. 
MR. W00TT0N: The one Mr. Brown just stated 
into the record? 
MR. CHIPMAN: Well I don't understand it. 
MR. W00TT0N: Well have you been in here and 
you understand it? 
MR. CHIPMAN: I have been in here a long 
time and I don't quite understand it but I 
guess it is all right. 
14. Mr. Chipman, in the presence of Dr. Osguthorpe was 
explained by affiant of the details of the settlement. The term 
"Stipulation" is not a term or word that is commonly used by 
Chipman, and the confusion, if any, was in my opinion a result of 
the use of the term "Stipulation." 
15. Immediately, affiant inquired of Dr. Osguthorpe on 
the record: 
MR. W00TT0N: All right Mr. Osterthorpe (sic) 
you are Mr. Chipman's frient? 
MR. OSTERTHORPE: Yes. 
MR. W00TT0N: You have been in the courtroom 
and heard it too? 
MR. OSTERTHORPE: Yes. 
MR. W00TT0N: And do you think it is 
reasonable? 
MR. OSTERTHORPE: Yes. 
MR. W00TT0N: That is all. 
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16. After the hearing vas concluded, affiant ordered a 
copy of the transcript from the Court Reporter, Mr. Tatton. 
The purpose of this transcript was to verify the formal written 
Stipulation and Judgment conformed with the oral stipulation 
and affiant's understanding of the Stipulation and the terms 
discussed at length with Chipman and Dr. Osguthorpe. 
! 
j 17. Chipman visited affiant at his office almost daily 
.following the settlement and affiant on those occasions discussed 
'at length the terms and conditions of the Stipulation and showed 
to Chipman the transcript. At one point in time affiant gave the 
'transcript to Chipman to keep and to refresh his memory about the 
terms. Affiant was asked by Chipman to prepare a schedule of pay-
ments Chipman would receive which affiant did. 
18. Affiant compared the written Stipulation for 
Settlement and Judgment with the transcript and found the Judgment 
to conform to the transcript of the oral stipulation. 
19. Affiant prepared, at the request of Chipman, the 
Notice of Cancellation dated April 29, 1988, and had a lengthy 
discussion with Chipman on that occasion and again reviewed the 
terms of the Judgment and Stipulation. 
DATED this f2y day of May, 1989. 
NOA'LL T. W00TT0N 
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ADDENDUM 7 
Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judg-
ments, orders or other parts of the record and errors 
therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative 
or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if 
any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an 
appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the 
appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereaf-
ter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected 
with leave of the appellate court 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable negle* 
newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc On motif 
and upon such terms as are just, the court may in ti 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal re 
resentative from a final judgment, order, or procee 
ing for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvc 
tence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly disco 
ered evidence which by due diligence could not ha' 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial und 
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denon 
nated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation 
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, f 
any cause, the summons in an action has not bet 
personally served upon the defendant as required 1 
Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear 
said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgme 
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prii 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed < 
otherwise vacated, or it 'is no longer equitable th 
the judgment should have prospective application; < 
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the oper 
tion of the judgment. The motion shall be mac 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (2 
or (4), not more than 3 months after the judgmes 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motic 
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finali 
of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule do 
not limit the power of a court to entertain an indepe 
dent action to relieve a party from a judgment, ord 
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for frai 
upon the court The procedure for obtaining any reli 
from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed 
these rules or by an independent action. 
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